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Abstract
Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers &
acquisitions might have an adverse eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms and beneﬁt multinational
enterprises (MNEs). However, given that domestic assets are suﬃciently scarce, we
identify a preemption eﬀect and an asset complementarity eﬀect which imply that the
acquisition price is substantially higher than the domestic seller’s reservation price.
The preemption eﬀect also implies that the seller might capture some of the MNEs’
initial rents. Moreover, other policies used in times of investment liberalization,
such as restructuring, are explained through their eﬀe c to nt h ev a l u eo ft h ed o m e s t i c
assets.
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anne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, and Tom Hedelius’ and Jan Wallander’s Research Foundations,
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In the last decade, we have witnessed a strong trend of investment liberalizations in devel-
oping and transition countries.1 Despite the generally welcoming attitude towards inward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among investment liberalizing countries2, concerns are
raised about the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on develop-
ment.3 One such concern is that underdeveloped equity markets or ﬁnancial crises allow
foreign entrants to acquire domestic ﬁr m sa t“ t o ol o w ”ap r i c e . 4 There is also a concern
that cross-border M&As, in contrast to greenﬁeld FDI (investment in new capital), do not
increase the productive capacity and might lead to future lay-oﬀs and the closing down
of some activities. Some countries restricts the right of foreign individuals and ﬁrms to
acquire domestic ﬁrms, or apply special restrictions to foreign ﬁrms in certain industries.5
1 Over the period 1991-1999, approximately 97 per cent of a total of 1035 changes in the regu-
latory Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regimes of countries were in the direction of liberalization
and mostly involved the opening of industries previously closed to FDI. These occurred in all
types of industries: petroleum, mining, energy, airports, telecommunication, tourism, ﬁlm mak-
ing, banking and insurance, retail trading and pharmaceuticals. See World Investment Report
(WIR) 2000.
2 In the early 1990s, the value of inward FDI in developing countries was about $50 billion
and in the late 1990s, it exceeded $200 billion. FDI today accounts for a large share of capital
formation in these countries, and FDI inﬂows as a percentage of private capital formation in all
industries have increased from 6.7 % in 1990 to 17.7% in 1998. The corresponding values for
Central and Eastern Europe were 0.79% in 1990 and 16.2 % in 1998, respectively. See WIR 2000.
3 The value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in developing countries has been
growing rapidly since the mid-1990s and constitutes about one third of the FDI inﬂows in this
period. The developing countries’ share of world cross-border M&As increased from 2 % in 1987
to almost 9 % in 1999. (WIR, 2000).
4 WIR 2000.
5 This is the case in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, for example. But the practise of
countries in this respect has also changed over time. For instance, by May 1998, restrictions
on foreign acquisitions of domestic shares in the stock market, and restrictions on M&As by
foreigners in the Republic of Korea had been abolished. However, the new investment policy still
2The ﬁrst purpose of this paper is to study the impact on the host country of diﬀerent
liberalization programs with respect to cross-border M&As, by comparing two diﬀerent
liberalizations programs: (i) allowing greenﬁeld investments but not cross-border M&As
(referred to as a discriminatory policy) or (ii) allowing greenﬁeld investments and cross-
border M&As (referred to as a non- discriminatory policy).6
To this end, we make the following distinction between entry by acquisition and green-
ﬁeld entry: the domestic assets are in scarce supply and the price is determined in an
auction type acquisition game, whereas greenﬁeld assets are not scarce and are sold at
a ﬁxed price. The limited availability of the ﬁrst type of assets may be associated with
the acquired ﬁrm having privileged access to distribution system, ownership of land or
permits, knowledge of the speciﬁc characteristics of the local market, locally well-known
brand names, or assets already in the market allowing early entry.7
To capture these aspects, we consider a model where a domestic ﬁrm is initially located
in the market in the host country, H. There are also several MNEs located in the world
market. The market in the host country will now be exposed to international competi-
tion. In the ﬁrst stage, the MNEs might acquire the domestic ﬁrm’s assets under the
non-discriminatory policy, whereas no cross-border acquisition is allowed under the dis-
criminatory policy. In the second stage, MNEs have the option of investing greenﬁeld in
favors greenﬁeld investment through, for instance, diﬀerent tax treatments of M&A investments
(WIR, 2000).
6 Note that we do not address the issue of whether the host country should investment liber-
alize.
7 This seems to be in line with the discussions in the business literature, where it is claimed
that the main motivation for choosing M&As over greenﬁeld investments is that the buyer then
quickly obtains unique assets. See WIR 2000 and its reference to diﬀerent studies of cross-border
M&As.
3new assets in country H. Finally, in the third stage, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion in
country H.
It is easy to identify circumstances under which MNEs might acquire domestic ﬁrms at
“too low” a price when bargaining between the acquiring MNE and the seller takes place
in isolation.8 However, we show that, for two reasons, the acquisition price is higher, and
possibly substantially higher, than the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation price when there are
several potential MNE-buyers. The ﬁrst is an asset complementarity eﬀect. It is likely that
the domestic assets are more eﬃciently used when transferred from domestic to foreign
ownership, since MNEs are typically ﬁrms with strong ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets in terms of
strong technology, know-how of marketing, organization etc.9 If this eﬃciency diﬀerence
is suﬃciently large, a surplus is created when the domestic assets are transferred to an
MNE.10 However, due to the bidding competition between the MNEs for buying these
assets, this entire surplus is captured by the target ﬁrm, i.e. the domestic ﬁrm. The
second eﬀect is a preemption eﬀect.11 If the domestic assets are more eﬃciently used by
an MNE, it is likely that the proﬁt of a non-acquiring MNE will decrease when the assets
are transferred from domestic to foreign ownership, which implies that the MNE gains
8 The MNE may then, for instance, use informational or ﬁnancial advantages in the bargaining,
thereby acquiring the domestic ﬁrm at a price substantially below its ”market value”.
9 Indeed, FDI is considered to be an important channel for transferring new technology and
knowledge into developing and transition countries (see, Caves (1996) or Markusen (1995)).
Lipsey (2000) argues that, more generally, one of the major functions of FDI is to transfer assets
from less eﬃcient to more eﬃcient owners and managers.
10 This eﬀect includes a market power eﬀect, since there will be one ﬁrm less in the host
market. However, the market power eﬀect alone is not necessarily enough to make a merger
proﬁtable. For instance, it is not enough in a homogenous good Cournot model without variable
cost savings, unless the merger gives rise to monopoly.
11 Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) and Horn and Persson (2001b) have identiﬁed this eﬀect in
merger formation models without greenﬁeld investment.
4from preventing other MNEs from obtaining the assets. Once more, due to the bidding
competition between MNEs12, this entire surplus is captured by the domestic ﬁrm.13
The amount of productive capacity in the market might, however, be lower under the
non-discriminatory policy (due to the acquisition of the domestic ﬁrm), which might lead
to higher consumer prices. Hence, we may have a classical trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency
and concentration. We show that if the MNEs’ use of the domestic assets is suﬃciently
more eﬃcient than that of the domestic ﬁrm, consumers will also be better oﬀ under the
non-discriminatory policy. This suggests that competition policy, but not a discriminatory
policy, might play an important role in these markets.
In some liberalization and privatization programs, we observe that governments use
(or encourage) diﬀerent types of restructuring prior to privatization (liberalization). Spe-
ciﬁc areas of restructuring include (1) a change in management and labor, (2) eﬃciency
programs and (3) investment and de-investment programs.14 Why would a government
12 The strategic motive for paying a high price for strategically important assets seems to have
been important in the bidding competition over Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo (Banespa), the
seventh-largest bank in Brazil. In November 2000, Banco Santander Central Hispanio (BSCH)
won a controlling minority stake in Banespa, in competition with several other large banks,
including its Spanish rival Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). According to Business
Week (April 23, 2001): “It cost an astronomical $3.55 billion, but it put BSCH back on top”
(before BBVA - authors´ comment). The assets of Banespa were considered strategically valuable
as indicated by the following quote ”Anyone who can add Banespa to their existing structure will
take a gigantic leap forward,” says Elio Duarte, director of institutional relations at the Brazilian
subsidiary of Britain’s HSBC Holdings PLC, one of the nine banks qualiﬁed to take part in the
auction.” (Business Week, November 20, 2000). According to Business Week (November 20,
2000), this means that ”...bidders will pay a premium not just to get their hands on Banespa
but also to stop rivals from doing so.”
13 From empirical studies on M&A performance, a robust ﬁnding in event studies is that target
share holders beneﬁt from a merger whereas the bidding ﬁrms´ share holders generally break
even (see Scherer and Ross, 1990).
14 This was the case in, for instance, the Mexican privatization program in the 1980s and 1990s,
5restructure instead of leaving it to the buyer to decide? The private buyer should be able
to achieve these goals at the same cost and more in line with her speciﬁc needs. However,
in an oligopoly, restructuring will have strategic product market eﬀects that may give
incentives for the government to restructure prior to privatization. We show that the gov-
ernment may have a stronger incentive to restructure, since it internalizes externalities on
rival ﬁrms through the selling price of the target ﬁrm in the host country. A ﬁrm restruc-
turing only takes into account how much its own proﬁt will increase from the restructuring.
The government, on the other hand, takes into account how the selling price increases;
it increases from an increased proﬁtf o rt h eb u y i n gﬁrm but also from a lower proﬁtf o r
the non-buying ﬁrm, whose proﬁts decreases due to its rival’s restructuring. While this
provides an argument for restructuring programs, a quick sale of the domestic assets is
also shown to be important. A slow sale of domestic assets might imply that the ﬁrst
mover advantage from entering by a M&A is reduced, since greenﬁeld entry then becomes
closer in time. The slow selling will then reduce the sales price for two reasons: (i) it
reduces the acquiring ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt, and (ii) it increases the non-acquiring
ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt and thus reduces the non-acquirer’s willingness to pay for the
assets.15 The paper ends with observations concerning the relation between tax policies
and FDI, when FDI takes place by acquisitions. We ﬁnd that a host country might beneﬁt
from international tax competition, since lower foreign taxes increase the acquisition price
of their domestic target ﬁrms.
see (Lopez-de-Silanes 1997).
15 Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) has shown that a slow selling in the Mexican privatization program
led to a substaintially lower sales price.
6The related theoretical literature on FDI and MNEs is surveyed in Markusen (1995).
However, this literature does not explicitly address the welfare eﬀects of the diﬀerent entry
modes: greenﬁeld or acquisition of assets already in the market, or both.16 There is also
a small theoretical literature addressing aspects of cross-border mergers in international
oligopoly markets.17 However, the equilibrium acquisition price is not determined in those
studies which is in focus here. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no paper in the privatization
literature deals with determining the equilibrium buyer in a situation where potential
buyers compete in an international oligopoly.18
The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium ownership
structure. Section 4 studies diﬀerent speciﬁed merger policies. In Section 5, we make
observations concerning restructuring policy and tax policy. Section 6 concludes. Finally,
most proofs appear in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a host country, H, where the market has previously been served by a single
domestic ﬁrm, denoted d, possessing one unit of domestic assets, denoted ¯ k.T h i sm a r k e t
will now be exposed to international competition by an investment liberalization.19
We assume that there are M symmetric MNEs in the world market.20 The MNEs do
16 See Markusen (1997) for a recent study of the eﬀects of investment liberalization on FDI.
17 This literature includes papers by, for example, Head and Reis (1997) and Horn and Persson
(2001a).
18 An exception is Norbäck and Persson (2001a). However, that paper studies privatizations
in developed countries, where the bidding competition between domestic and foreign ﬁrms is at
focus.
19 It is of no consequence whether the market was previously open to imports.
20 We take the number of MNEs, M, as exogenous as a consequence of large entry barriers into
7not initially have any assets in Country H, but might now invest. The interaction takes
place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the MNEs might acquire the domestic ﬁrm’s assets
under the non-discriminatory policy. Under the discriminatory policy, no acquisitions are
allowed. In the second stage, MNEs can invest greenﬁeld in new assets in country H,
denoted kG,a taﬁxed cost, G. Finally, in the third stage, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly
f a s h i o ni nc o u n t r yH . 21
To simplify the analysis, we assume investments into assets to be ”lumpy”, i.e. they
come in discrete assets or plants and the domestic ﬁrm is not able to invest in stage two due
to, for instance, ﬁnancial or managerial restrictions. It can be shown that the main results
of this paper would hold also if capital investments were continuous; the presentation
would then be much more tedious, however.22 We also assume that all M MNEs direct
invest - either by acquiring the domestic ﬁrm, or investing greenﬁeld. That is, we assume
that direct investment is more proﬁtable than other alternatives for supplying the market
(i.e. exporting to the market).23
The next sections describe the product market interaction, the greenﬁeld investment
game, and the acquisition game.
the industry. Moreover, we assume the size of the market in country H to be small compared to
the world market.
21 The choice of timing between the acquisition and the greenﬁeld investment is not obvious
in a general setting. In this particular application, however, it seems natural for the acquisition
decision to be made before the greenﬁeld decision, since the assets for sale already exist in the
market and entering greenﬁeld requires the construction of a new plant, which is usually time
consuming.
22 Proofs for the case with continuous capital investments are available from the authors upon
request.
23 It can be shown that the results derived below will also hold in a setting involving entry
eﬀects. This is at focus in a companion paper, Norbäck and Persson (2001b).
82.1. Stage two and three: investment - and product market interaction
The proﬁts in the industry will depend on the distribution of asset ownership. For sym-
metry, we only need to distinguish between two types of ownership structures: (i) the one
where the domestic assets are sold to one of the MNEs, denoted km, and (ii) the one where
the domestic assets remain in the hands of the domestic owner, denoted kd.
Vectors km and kd are deﬁned as follows:
k
m =( 0 ,γ¯ k,kG,...,kG       
M−1
), γ > 0 (2.1)
k
d =( ¯ k,kG,k G,..,kG       
M
) (2.2)
The ﬁrst entry show the asset ownership of the domestic ﬁrm, the second entry is the
asset ownership of the potentially acquiring MNE and the remaining entries show the
asset ownership of the non-acquiring MNEs. Note that under domestic ownership, there
are M MNEs that invest greenﬁeld, whereas under MNE ownership, there is one acquiring
MNE and M − 1 non-acquiring MNEs investing greenﬁeld.
Note that the change from domestic to foreign ownership might imply a more eﬃ-
cient use the local assets, ¯ k.W ed e ﬁne γ as measuring the complementarity between the
domestic assets ¯ k and MNEs’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. MNEs are typically leading ﬁrms in
their respective industries and possess ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge in terms of technology or
know-how of organization of production and marketing (see Markusen (1995) and Caves
(1995)). It is likely that at least some of this knowledge is transferred under a change of
ownership, resulting in a more eﬃcient use of the local assets ¯ k. This corresponds to a γ
9substantially larger than one in the model.24 25
Under MNE ownership of the domestic assets ¯ k,w el e tπA(km) denote the reduced-form
product market proﬁt for the acquiring MNE, while πG(km) denotes the corresponding
proﬁt for a non-acquiring MNE as a greenﬁeld entrant. Under domestic ownership of
assets ¯ k, MNEs are greenﬁeld entrants with proﬁts πG(kd). The corresponding proﬁtf o r
the domestic ﬁrm under the respective ownership structures are πd(kl),l= {d,m}.












≡ 0, h = {d,G}.
As the local assets ¯ k will be used diﬀerently under domestic and foreign ownership,
this will have strategic eﬀects. Assumption 1 then states that an increase in complemen-
tarity, γ, increases the acquirer’s proﬁt, whereas the market proﬁt for a non-acquirer (i.e.
greenﬁeld investor) decreases. The size of these eﬀects depends on the strength of the
complementarities between MNEs’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and the domestic assets. For exam-
ple, the combination of an MNE’s strong brand name and the acquired ﬁrm´s knowledge
of the market or strength in distribution may provide the acquiring MNE with a strong
24 There are many studies conﬁrming that technologies and knowledge are transferred to host-
countries through FDI (see Caves 1995). If foreign-owned ﬁrms are more eﬃcient than domes-
tically owned ﬁrms, some of the rents generated are likely to be captured by labour. Aitken,
Harrison and Lipsey (1996) do ﬁnd positive wage diﬀerentials between foreign and domestic en-
terprises in Mexico and Venezuela. On the other hand, Aitken and Harrison (1999) ﬁnd that
foreign-owned enterprises have higher total factor productivity than domestically owned ones
only for plants with less than 50 employees. However, these studies do not compare the pro-
ductivity in the plant before and after a foreign take-over, which would here be the appropriate
measure.
25 Our set-up here could be interpreted as the acquirer investing sequentially after the acquisi-
tion. To simplify the analysis, we assume this cost be zero. This assumption is relaxed in Section
5.1.
10market position. If the brand name of the domestic assets are locally very strong, the
strategic value of the assets will also be high. Or, if the domestic assets are sold at an
e a r l ys t a g e ,t h ea c q u i r e rm a yg a i nas t r o n gﬁrst-mover advantage, building up a dominant
position in the product market.26
In assumption 2, we also take into account that the size of the local assets - not only
the type of owner - may be of importance. A larger size of the domestic assets will beneﬁt















This set-up and these assumptions are compatible with several diﬀerent oligopoly mod-
els. For example, Farrell and Shapiro (1996) studies exogenous assets ownership changes,
assuming the product market competition to be Cournot. Under general assumptions on
demand and costs, they show that an increase in capital for a ﬁrm (i) increases this ﬁrm’s
proﬁt, while (ii) decreasing the proﬁts of its competitors. Since an increase in γ or ¯ k corre-
sponds to an increase in eﬀective asset ownership for the acquiring MNE, and the Farrell
and Shapiro model (1996) is compatible with this set-up. Moreover, using a quantity-
setting conjectural variation oligopoly model under a set of stability criteria, Dixit (1986)
shows that a change, which is prima facie favorable for a ﬁr m ,a si sa ni n c r e a s ei ne ﬀective
capital (through γ or ¯ k), reduces the proﬁts of all other ﬁrms. To illustrate our results,
we will in some parts of our analysis make use of a linear Cournot model.
26 As a speciﬁc example, in the retail industry, MNEs acquire local retail chains and combine
their advantages of global sourcing with the advantages of the established distrubution network.
As Greenﬁeld entry does not have this advantage, and it takes more time to build local assets,
an acquiring MNE is at an advantage. While having the intitial posession over the distrbution
network, a domestic ﬁrm lacks the advantage of global sourcing.
112.2. Stage one: the acquisition game
To focus on the bidding competition among MNEs as the determinant of the equilibrium
buyer, we assume that ﬁrm d cannot make a bid on the MNEs. This assumption might
be motivated by the domestic owner being ﬁnancially weaker or lacking the competence
to eﬃciently run the larger business. Moreover, it is assumed that MNEs cannot make
bids on each other’s ﬁrms. This assumption might be supported in two basic ways in a
full merger model. One is to assume that the proﬁt of a merged entity is small enough
to imply that no merger takes place between the MNEs.27 The second possibility would
be to assume that mergers between MNEs would not be permitted by the competition
authorities.
The acquisition process is depicted as an auction where M MNEs simultaneously post
bids and the domestic ﬁrm then either accepts or rejects these bids.28 Each MNE an-
nounces a bid, bi, for the domestic ﬁrm. b =( b1,..bi..,bM) ∈ RM is the vector of these
bids. Following the announcement of b, the domestic ﬁrm may be sold to one of the MNEs
at the bid price or remain in the ownership of ﬁrm d.I fm o r et h a no n eb i di sa c c e p t e d ,t h e
bidder with the highest bid obtains the domestic assets. If there is more than one MNE
with such a bid, each such MNE obtains the assets with equal probability. The acquisition
is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest amount,
27 For instance, it has been shown by Kamien and Zang (1990) that the hold up problem in
merger formation might lead to no merger taking place in equilibrium, if the initial number of
ﬁrms are suﬃciently large. Moreover, mergers might be non-proﬁtable since the costs associated
with mergers can be substantial, for example due to problems of fusing together diﬀerent company
cultures.
28 The main result in the acquisition game would also hold in a setting where the domestic
ﬁrm states an asking price simultaneously with the MNEs´ bids.
12ε, chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ valuations of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets, ¯ k.T h e r ea r et h r e e
diﬀerent valuations which need to be considered:
• vmm is the value for an MNE of obtaining ¯ k when a rival MNE would otherwise
obtain ¯ k.T h eﬁrst term shows the proﬁt when possessing ¯ k. The second term shows
the proﬁti far i v a lM N Eo b t a i n s¯ k, in which case the MNE invests greenﬁeld.
vmm = πA(k
m) − [πG(k
m) − G] (2.3)
• vmd is the value for an MNE of obtaining ¯ k, when the domestic ﬁrm would otherwise
keep them. The proﬁt for an MNE of not obtaining assets ¯ k is diﬀerent in this case












3. The equilibrium ownership structure
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). The ﬁrms’
bidding behavior is dependent on the relation between their own valuation of obtaining
assets ¯ k and all other ﬁrms’ valuations of obtaining these assets. Since MNEs are sym-
metric, valuations vmm,v md and vd can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways, as shown in table
133.1. These inequalities are useful for solving the model and illustrating the results. We
can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price are described
in table 3.1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Table 3.1: The equilibrium ownership structure and acquisition price.
Inequality: Deﬁnition: Ownership structure: Acquisition price
I1: vmm >v md >v d km vmm
I2: vmm >v d >v md km vmm
I3: vmd >v mm >v d km vmm
I4: vmd >v d >v mm km vd
I5: vd >v mm >v md kd .
I6: vd >v md >v mm kd .
Lemma 1 shows that when one of the inequalities I1,I 3,o rI4 holds, ¯ k is obtained
by one of the MNEs. Under I1 and I3, the acquiring MNE pays the acquisition price
A = vmm,a n dA = vd under I4.W h e nI5 or I6 holds, the domestic ﬁrm keeps its assets.
When I2 holds, there exist multiple equilibria.29 In the next sections, we shall explore the
policy implications of these ﬁndings.
29 An equilibrium where ﬁrm d keeps the assets and no MNE posts a bid above vd. There is
also an equilibrium where one of the MNE´s obtains the assets at a price vmm − ε and another
MNE posts the second highest bid at vmm − 2ε.
144. Merger policy
Concerns have been raised in the policy debate about the impact of M&As on the devel-
opment in developing countries, despite the generally welcoming attitude towards inward
FDI. Arguments have been put forward, indicating that cross-border M&As do not increase
productive capacity or that ﬁnancial crises allow foreign entrants to acquire domestic ﬁrms
at “too low” a price. More generally, MNEs are considered to beneﬁt disproportionately
from globalization, while local ﬁrms in developing countries are perceived as adversely
aﬀected. We address these issues by comparing two government policies: (i) A discrimina-
tory policy which does not allow for cross-border M&As (henceforth denoted the D-policy),
and (ii) a non-discriminatory policy allowing for cross border M&As (henceforth denoted
the ND-policy).
4.1. Host-country welfare
The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As and market structures in an international
oligopoly is typically made by comparing the sum of domestic consumer surplus and do-
mestic proﬁts in diﬀerent market structures. We follow this approach, but add the sales
price of ﬁrm d:s assets into the domestic welfare measure, when the domestic assets are
sold. It follows that the ND- and D-policies only diﬀer when an MNE acquires the domestic
assets ¯ k under the ND-policy, i.e. whenever one of the inequalities I1−I4 holds. Then, let
WND = W(km) denote the welfare level when an MNE obtains the domestic asset under
the ND-policy, and let WD = W(kd) denote the welfare level under the D-policy. Deﬁning












,( 4 . 1 )
where A is the acquisition price of assets ¯ k, πd(kd) is the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt, CS(kd)
the consumer surplus under domestic ownership of ¯ k,a n dCS(km) the consumer surplus
under foreign ownership of ¯ k.T h eﬁrst term in (4.1) captures the diﬀerence in producer
surplus and the second term captures the diﬀerence in consumer surplus between the two
policies.
We start by comparing the domestic producer surplus. It follows directly that if the
assets are sold, the price is higher than the reservation price, i.e. A >v d = πd(kd).
However, as shown in Lemma 1, the acquisition price will be the maximum of vmm and vd.
The acquisition price may thus be substantially higher than the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation
price for which there are two reasons. To illustrate this, note that under I1, the acquisitions
price is equal to vmm. The diﬀerence between the acquisition price, A, and the domestic
ﬁrm’s reservation price, vd, can then be rewritten as follows:
A−vd = vmm − vd
=[ vmd − vd]+[ vmm − vmd]
=[ πA(k
m) − (πG(k







,( 4 . 2 )
The ﬁrst term in (4.2) is the asset complementarity eﬀect.A sa r g u e da b o v e ,i ti sl i k e l yt h a t
the domestic assets are more eﬃciently used when transferred from domestic to foreign
ownership. If this eﬃciency diﬀerence is large enough, this will lead to a surplus when the
assets are transferred to an MNE, i.e., πA(km)−(πG(kd)−G) >πd(kd). Due to the bidding
competition between the MNEs over the domestic assets, this entire surplus is captured
16by the target ﬁrm, i.e. the domestic ﬁrm. The second term in (4.2) is the preemption
eﬀect. The proﬁt of a non-acquiring MNE will decrease when the assets are transferred
from domestic to foreign ownership, if the assets are used more eﬃciently by an MNE,
i.e. πG(kd)−πG(km) > 0. This implies that an MNE then gains from preventing another
MNE from obtaining the assets. Once more, due to the bidding competition between the
MNEs, this entire surplus is captured by the domestic ﬁrm. Consequently, the producer
surplus may be higher, and possibly substantially higher, under the ND-policy.30
Turning to the consumer surplus, we know from the discussion above that the domestic
assets might be more eﬃciently used when transferred from domestic to foreign ownership.
This, in turn, may spill over in lower consumer prices. However, the number of greenﬁeld
entrants is lower under the ND-policy (due to the acquisition of the domestic ﬁrm)and
hence we may have a classical trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and concentration.
We can then derive the following result:
Proposition 1. (i) The non-discriminatory policy leads to a higher domestic producer
surplus and a higher or lower domestic consumer surplus than the discriminatory policy.
(ii) the non-discriminatory policy leads to a higher domestic consumer surplus than the
discriminatory policy in the Linear Cournot Model for a suﬃciently large complementarity
between the domestic assets and propriety assets of the MNEs, γ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
30 This ﬁnding does not imply that an ND-policy always leads to a higher producer surplus,
however. The domestic ﬁrm might be the preferred buyer if there are several domestic ﬁrms,
since the acquirer does not pay for the aggregate externalities its acquisition creates.
17T h u si ft h eM N E su s et h ed o m e s t i ca s s e t ss u ﬃciently more eﬃciently than the domestic
ﬁrm, consumers will also be better oﬀ under the non-discriminatory policy.
4.1.1. The Linear Cournot Model
To illustrate how complementarities between the ﬁrm-speciﬁca s s e t so ft h eM N E sa n dt h e
domestic assets aﬀect the equilibrium ownership structure and welfare, we use a linear
Cournot model where demand is P = a − Q,a n dQ is total quantity. The marginal cost
for a ﬁrm of type h is 31
ch =

      
      
cA = c − γ¯ k
cG = c − kG
cd = c − ¯ k
. (4.3)
The product market proﬁts of the ﬁrms will be quadratic functions of their quantities,
i.e. πh = q2
h. Assuming that marginal costs and ﬁrm quantities are positive (i.e. ch > 0
and qh > 0), the proﬁts of the diﬀerent types of ﬁr m sa saf u n c t i o no ft h eo w n e r s h i p
structure are given in table A.1 in the appendix. In this table, we also provide expressions
for consumer surplus and the acquisition price.
In ﬁg 4.1, we illustrate how the equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) and the ac-
quisition price are related to diﬀerent values of the complementarity parameter γ and the
size of the domestic assets ¯ k.W e s e et h a t γ must be suﬃciently high for an acquisition
to occur. Hence, cross-border acquisitions are associated with a more eﬃcient use of the
domestic assets (i.e. γ > 1).
In ﬁgure 4.2, the consumer surplus eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies are depicted. Note
31 We used a wide range of parameter values and alternative speciﬁcations of both costs and













































Figure 4.3: Welfare under foreign ownership (km) and domestic owmnership (kd).
that consumers gain from foreign ownership of the domestic assets when γ is suﬃciently
high, since a more eﬃcient use of assets ¯ k outweighs the negative eﬀects of a more concen-
trated market structure. There is, however, a region where consumers are worse oﬀ from
a foreign acquisition, and where the increase in eﬃciency is not large enough to outweigh
a more concentrated market structure.
Considering total welfare, adding the acquisition price to consumer surplus, the region
where the D-policy is preferred becomes much smaller. This can be seen by comparing
ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2. The eﬀects on foreign producers (MNEs)
Let us now turn to the proﬁt of an MNE under the two policies. Once more, the only
diﬀerence between the policies is when the domestic assets are sold under the ND-policy,
which is the case when I1, I2, I3, or I4 holds. The MNEs prefer the D-policy under I1 and
20I2. To see this, note that the acquisition price is A = vmm >v md. It then follows that
an MNE’s valuation of the domestic assets when the domestic ﬁrm holds the assets ¯ k (as
it does under the D-policy), vmd, is lower than the price this ﬁrm would pay under the
ND-policy, vmm. Consequently, MNEs prefer the D-policy in this interval. The D-policy
“helps” MNEs avoid a bidding competition over the domestic assets that would be a loss
for them.
Under I3, the acquisition price is A = vmm <v md. MNEs then prefer the ND-policy,
since the acquisition price is now lower than their willingness to pay, if ﬁrm d would
otherwise keep its asset. Under I4, vmd > A = vd >v mm. Consequently, MNEs prefer the
ND-policy.
We then have the following result
Proposition 2. MNEs prefer the discriminatory policy under I1 and I2, and the non-
discriminatory policy under I3 and I4.
Note that the MNEs beneﬁt from the investment liberalization in general, since their
proﬁts are positive under either type of liberalization.
5. Additional policy issues
The above model can be used to a make couple of remarks on additional policy issues
concerning cross-border M&As. We discuss restructuring polices and eﬀects of tax evasion.
To illuminate how cross-border M&As interact with these policies, we shall assume that
parameter values are such that I1,I2 or I3 are fulﬁlled, so that equilibrium ownership
structure is km.
215.1. Why would a government encourage restructuring?
In some liberalization and privatization programs, we observe that governments use (or
encourage) diﬀerent types of restructuring prior to privatization (liberalization). Speciﬁc
areas of restructuring include (1) change in management and labor, (2) eﬃciency programs
(3) investment and de-investment programs.32 Why would a government restructure in-
s t e a do fl e a v i n gi tt ot h eb u y e rt od e c i d e ? 33 The private buyer should be able to achieve
these goals at the same cost and more in line with her speciﬁcn e e d s . 34 However, in an
oligopoly, restructuring will have strategic product market eﬀects that may give incentives
for the government to restructure prior to privatization.
In order to study this issue, a ﬁrst period, 0, is now included in the analysis, where
the government may restructure the domestic assets into capacity ¯ kS from the initial
level ¯ k0. In period 1, the acquiring ﬁrm may now restructure upon acquisition, given
¯ kS, r e s t r u c t u r i n gi n t oc a p a c i t y¯ kA.T o f o c u s o n t h e s t r a t e g i c e ﬀects of restructuring, we
assume that the cost of restructuring is equal for the government and the acquirer. Let
32 This was the case in, for instance, the Mexican privatization program in the 1980s and 1990s.
See (Lopez-de-Silanes 1997).
33 There are several reasons why the domestic (state) ﬁrm may not have restructured earlier
under protection, when acquisition was not an option. First, new technologies might be used in
the future that were previously not available due to protection or technological shifts. Second,
incentives for restructuring under protection might have been low due to bad incentive schemes.
For instance, Roland and Sekkat (2000) show that if there is asymmetric information on man-
agerial skills, good managers have small incentives to exert eﬀo r ti nas o c i a l i s te c o n o m yb e c a u s e
of the ratchet eﬀect. Moreover, in a context of career concerns, they show a positive incentive
eﬀect on preprivatization restructuring.
Finally, note that sequential investments are observed in many cross-border acquisition (WIR,
2000).
34 Informational, political and ﬁnancial restrictions could explain why governments should
(sequentially) restructure prior to privatizations. (See for instance, Roland (1994).
22C (¯ k) denote the marginal cost of restructuring the domestic assets, where we assume that
C (¯ k) ≥ 0 and C  (¯ k) ≥ 0. To simplify the notation, we write proﬁt expressions as direct
functions of ¯ k, πh(¯ k), omitting the asset-ownership vector km as an argument. In addition
to Assumption 2, we assume πA(¯ k) to be strictly concave in ¯ k, i.e
dπA
d¯ k
> 0,a n d
d2πA
d¯ k2 < 0.
The game is solved backwards. Periods 3 and 2 are the same as in the previous sections.
In period 1, given the choice of the government, ¯ kS, the acquirer maximizes πA(¯ kA)−C(¯ kA)
by choosing ¯ kA optimally, thereby facing the following marginal investment costs:
C




0:¯ kA ≤ ¯ kS
C (¯ kA):¯ kA > ¯ kS
(5.1)
To proceed, we deﬁne the optimal choice by the private ﬁrm if the government would not
















¯ kS : ¯ kP
A ≤ ¯ kS
¯ kP
A : ¯ kP
A > ¯ kS
(5.3)
Hence, whenever ¯ kP
A ≤ ¯ kS, the acquiring MNE refrains from restructuring and just uses
the (cost-less) capacity installed by the government, ¯ kS.G i v e nt h a t¯ kP
A > ¯ kS,t h eo p t i m a l
capacity ¯ k∗
A is given by (5.2).
In period 0, the government internalizes the dependency of the acquirer’s capacity
investment, ¯ k∗
A,o ni t so w ni n v e s t m e n t ,¯ kS. To focus on strategic product market eﬀects,
let us ignore consumer eﬀects for the moment. The government then maximizes welfare by
maximizing the acquisition price, A = vmm, net the restructuring cost. The government´s
23maximization problem is illustrated in the lower diagram in ﬁgure 5.1. Foreseeing the
acquirer´s optimal restructuring, ¯ k∗
A, the marginal beneﬁt of restructuring for ¯ kS ≤ ¯ kP
A is
simply C (¯ k). The government then only aﬀects the cost of achieving the acquirer’s optimal
restructuring, but these cost savings for the acquirer directly increases the acquisition
p r i c e . M o r e o v e r ,i tf o l l o w sf r o m( 5 . 3 )t h a tt h el e v e l¯ kA is not changed. However, if the
government reﬂects on a capacity choice ¯ kS > ¯ kP













The optimal ¯ kS is indicated as ¯ k∗
S in the lower diagram in ﬁgure 5.1. Comparing, ex-
pressions (5.2) and (5.4), we see that the government has stronger incentives to invest in
capacity than the acquiring MNE. The government achieves a higher acquisition price by
exploiting the negative externalities on the non-acquirers, captured by the term
dπG
d¯ k < 0
from Assumption 2. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1.
Thus we have the following result:
Proposition 3. The government has a stronger incentive to restructure (encourage re-
structuring) the domestic assets than the acquiring ﬁrm, since it internalizes the external-
ities on rival ﬁrms through the selling price.
It might be questioned whether the government has the ability to restructure as eﬃ-
ciently as the private ﬁrm. However, the above ﬁnding might explain why the government,
even though it is inferior in restructuring, tries to do this.35
35 We are assuming that the acquirer can invest before greenﬁeld investment takes place. If
investment take place simultaneously, the incentive for the government to restructure would
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Figure 5.1: Comparing private and government incentives for restructuring.
25In a welfare analysis, eﬀects on consumers and other domestic ﬁrms should be taken
into account. The consumer eﬀect will increase the government’s incentive to restructure,
since restructuring creates lower prices. However, business stealing from domestic rivals
will decrease the incentive for restructuring by the government, the total eﬀect then being
ambiguous. Comparing private and government incentives for restructuring.
5.2. The importance of speed in restructuring
While the result above provides an argument why governments use restructuring programs,
the importance of selling the domestic assets quickly has also been argued to be impor-
tant. Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) has shown that a slow selling in the Mexican privatization
program lead to a substantially lower sales price. A slow selling of the assets may lead
to lower productivity due to, for instance, managerial distraction and foregone investment
opportunities. On the other hand, incentives may not deteriorate if career concerns make
managers of SOEs eager to establish a good reputation in the labor market.36 Here, we
provide strategic product market arguments why a slow selling may lead to a substantially
lower sales price.
If early entry is strategically valuable to create consumer loyalty or learning country
speciﬁc characteristics, a slow selling of the domestic assets, i.e. a smaller gap in time
between acquisition entry and greenﬁeld entry, might then reduce γ in our setting. Noting
increase further. The reason being that the government then has a possibility to commit to large
investment, a commitment not available for the private buyer.
36 See Roland and Sekkat (2000).









dγ < 0, (5.5)
where
dπA
dγ > 0 and
dπG
dγ < 0 follow from Assumption 1.
A slow selling then leads to a lower sale price, since the delay reduces the acquirer’s
proﬁt. However, the slow selling also implies that the proﬁt of the non-acquiring ﬁrms
increases. This, in turn, leads to an even further decrease in the sale price, since the
willingness to pay for the assets then decreases even further. Thus, we have the following
result:
Proposition 4. A slow selling of domestic assets reduces the sales price for two reasons:
(i) it reduces the acquiring ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt, and (ii) it increases the non-
acquiring ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt and thus, reduces the non-acquirer´s willingness to
pay for the assets.
5.3. Tax evasion
It has been argued that host countries might have problems in generating corporate taxes
from MNEs investing in their countries, since MNEs can reduce their overall tax burden
by shifting proﬁts toward low tax countries and away from high tax countries.37 Thus,
countries are then hurt by tax reductions in other countries since their corporate tax
income is reduced. The typical approach in this literature has been to study eﬀects of
corporate tax changes, taking the asset price as given, i.e. assuming that FDI is in the
37 It has been recognized that ﬁrms may employ transfer pricing techniques, allowing them to
shift proﬁts to low tax locations. For instance, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) ﬁnd evidence
that tax diﬀerences have a signiﬁcant impact on where incomes are declared. See also the WIR
1998.
27form of greenﬁeld. However, in the case of FDI by acquisition, tax levels do not only aﬀect
domestic welfare by aﬀecting the equilibrium market structure and tax revenues, but also
by changes in asset prices. Here, we will illustrate eﬀects of tax competition, when FDI
take place through M&As which, to our knowledge, has not been previously pointed out .
Suppose that there is a foreign tax-haven oﬀering a lower corporate tax rate than
the host-country, t<t H. Moreover, assume that the MNEs can use transfer pricing to
completely avoid corporate taxes in the host-country. Since no MNE will pay taxes in the
host country, the acquisition price becomes:
A =( 1− t)[πA − (πG − G)] (5.6)
where (1 − t)πA is the after-tax product market proﬁt of the acquirer and where the
after-tax product market proﬁt of a non-acquirer (greenﬁeld entrant) net greenﬁeld costs
is (1 − t)(πG − G).
It follows from (5.6) that the acquisition price, A, will be higher the lower is the tax
rate in the foreign tax haven. The host country is better oﬀ when taxes are lower abroad,
since a larger part of the foreign producer surplus can be repatriated to the host country.38
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 5. A host country might beneﬁt from tax competition through an increased
acquisition price of their domestic target ﬁrms.
Note that the government can tax the domestic ﬁrm’s owners for the proceeds of the
38 If the host country initially had the lower tax, and the other country (the tax haven) reduced
its taxes below the level of the host country, the host country might be hurt, since the tax revenue
might then decrease more than the acquisition price increases.
28MNE acquisition, as long as the tax level is suﬃciently low enough not to prevent the
acquisition.39
6. Concluding discussion
In this paper, we have shown that investment liberalizing countries might forego the pos-
sibility of welfare enhancing M&As when having restrictions on cross-border M&As. The
reason is that combining assets in these situations means a great possibility of creating
a surplus for the ﬁrms involved, since MNEs are typically ﬁrms with strong ﬁrm-speciﬁc
assets and local ﬁrms have access to country-speciﬁc assets. Moreover, if the domestic
assets provide the acquirer with a strong position in the host market relative to other
MNEs, MNEs gain from preventing other MNEs from obtaining the assets, thereby fur-
ther increasing the surplus. We have then shown that if domestic assets are suﬃciently
scarce, the domestic ﬁrm will capture the created surplus.
Moreover, under the discriminatory policy, the domestic ﬁrm might be forced out of
the market due to competition from the potentially more eﬃcient MNEs. However, the
domestic assets might be valuable for the MNEs and a cross-border M&A would take
place if allowed. Consequently, by trying to protect the domestic producers from foreign
M&As, the policy maker might cause the exit of domestic producers, and exit without any
compensation.
We have also shown that other government policies used in times of investment liber-
alizations, such as restructuring and the timing of sales, could be explained through their
39 Note, that the host country beneﬁts from the tax cut, even though it does not have domestic
ﬁrms that could exploit the reduced tax abroad.
29eﬀect on the value of the domestic assets and the share of the surplus captured by the
domestic owners in cross-border M&As.
The model put forward rests on some simplifying assumption, for example, we assume
that MNEs make bids on the domestic ﬁrm’s assets. The domestic owner could, however,
use the payment for its assets to buy shares in the MNE (or its aﬃliate). Consequently, the
model could be interpreted as a model of mergers. Moreover, the main results would also
hold if the acquisition and greenﬁeld decisions were assumed to take place simultaneously.
To see this, note that as long as the domestic assets are scarce and their use by an MNE
shifts proﬁts from greenﬁeld investors to the acquiring MNE, vmm might be higher than
vmd and vd, and thus the domestic assets will then be sold at the price vmm.
Governments often promote FDI to encourage ”spillovers” from foreign to domestic
ﬁrms. We have abstracted from the eﬀects of spillovers in our analysis. At ﬁrst sight, such
spillovers seem to make a discriminatory policy more preferable, since there should be more
domestic ﬁrms in the market receiving such spillovers under the discriminatory policy.
However, while this argument is valid, there are some caveats. First, as argued above,
domestic ﬁrms might be forced out of the market under the discriminatory policy and thus,
the number of domestic ﬁrms might not be higher under the discriminatory policy. Second,
recent empirically ﬁndings suggest that the ability to absorb spillovers is increasing in the
share of foreign ownership.40 If that is the case, a non-discriminatory policy becomes more
preferable, since spillovers to ”domestic ﬁrms” partly owned by foreigner will be higher.41
40 See Aitken and Harrison (1999).
41 If infant-industry eﬀects are important, a discriminatory policy might be preferable. How-
ever, not only cross-border M&As, but also greenﬁeld investment, might then reduce welfare.
30A crucial assumption is that the domestic assets are unique, i.e. there are no other
domestic ﬁrms. Will the results in the paper hold if this assumption is relaxed? Our
analysis seems valid for situations where the domestic assets are suﬃciently scarce. For
instance, the results derived here would hold if we had a smaller number of domestic
ﬁrms, denoted D, than MNEs, denoted M, and each of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets were
auctioned out sequentially, and assuming that it would be proﬁtable for an MNE to buy
one domestic asset only. The analysis presented above would then apply when the assets
of the last domestic ﬁrm are sold out. Assuming that γ is large enough then implies
that an acquisition takes place at a price vmm. In the second last period, assuming that
the complementarity between MNEs’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and domestic assets, γ, is large
enough, the price would be determined in the same fashion, i.e. the buying MNE being
indiﬀerent between buying and not buying. Consequently, the acquisition price for any of
the assets would be A = πA(km) − [πG(km) − G],w h e r ekm is the capital vector when D
MNEs own one domestic asset each and M − D MNEs enter greenﬁeld. It then follows
that the results derived above hold.
I ft h e r ew e r em o r ed o m e s t i cﬁrms than MNEs, the situation might be very diﬀerent.
Assume that a domestic ﬁrm cannot make positive proﬁts when the MNEs have entered.
Then, in the last period, if there are two domestic ﬁrms left the remaining MNE could then
play them out against each other, buying the assets at a price close to zero. In the second
last period, the price will be determined in the same fashion and hence, the acquisition
price for any of the assets will be close to zero.
31A. Appendix:
We ﬁrst prove Lemma 1 and proposition 2. We then prove part (ii) of proposition 1 using
a linear Cournot model.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
A.1.1. Solving for the equilibrium buyer
First, note that bi ≥ maxvml,l= {d,m} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no MNE
will post a bid equal or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and that ﬁrm
d will accept a bid in stage 2, iﬀ bi >v d.
Inequality I1 Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes).L e tu sa s s u m e
that MNE w  = d is the MNE that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets and
ﬁrm s  = d the MNE with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vmm is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm − ε is not an equilibrium,
since ﬁrm j  = w,d then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain
the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm − ε,
and b∗
s ∈ [vmm − ε,v mm − 2ε], then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to
no, ﬁrm d´s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd.
Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate and thus b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b m,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let MNE h be the MNE with the highest
bid. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.B u tM N Ej  = d will have the incentive to deviate
to b  = vd + ε in period 1, since vmd >v d. This contradicts the assumption that b is a
32Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,y). Then, b∗
w ≥ vij is
a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ij − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,d then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm −ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vmm −ε,v mm −2ε]
then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation vd. Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no
incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗∗ =( b∗∗
1 ,b ∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w >v d is not an
equilibrium since ﬁrm d would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes.I fb∗
w ≤ vd,t h e nn oM N E
has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases since it then
sells its assets at a price below its valuation, vd.F i r md has no incentive to deviate and
thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.




is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm−ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,d then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm−ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vmm −ε,v mm−2ε],
then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases,
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation vd. Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no
incentive to deviate and thus b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,bM,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.
33But MNE j  = d will then have the incentive to deviate to b  = vd + ε in stage 1, since
vmd >v d. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm w would then beneﬁt from deviating to bw = vd. b∗
w <v d
is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm d would then not accept any bid. If b∗
w = vd,t h e nﬁrm
w has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b 
j ≤ b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s, j  = w,d,p a y o ﬀ does not
change. By deviating to b 
j >b ∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay vmm. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ does not change. Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate and
thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.B u t
MNE j  = d will have the incentive to deviate to b  = vd + ε in stage 1 since vmd >v d,
which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




i <v d ∀i ∈ M. It then follows directly that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Then, note that ﬁrm d will accept a bid iﬀ bi ≥ vd. But bi ≥ vd is a weakly dominated
bid in these intervals, since vd > max{vmm,v md}. Thus, the assets will not be sold in these
intervals.
34A.2. Proofs of statements concerning the Linear Model
Proﬁts, consumer surplus and acquisition price for the linear model are given in table A.1,
below.42
Table A.1: Proﬁts, consumer surplus and acquisition price for the linear Cournot model
in the two equilibrium ownership structures.




































γ¯ k − kG
  2Λ+γ¯ k(M−1)−kG(M−3)
M+1 + G
It can be noted that these proﬁt functions fulﬁll both assumption 1 and assumption 2.
In the actual simulations shown in the text, we assume that M =5 ,G =0 .1,k G =1 .5 and
Λ = a − c =6 . The simulations are then performed by using roughly 2000 combinations
of ¯ k and γ and solving the model for each such combination. The resulting equilibrium
ownership structure (EOS), consumer surplus and welfare are shown in ﬁgures 4.1-4.3.




(M+2)2 < 0 and
42The acquisition price written out in table A.1 is A = vmm, which holds under I1,I2 or I3.U n d e rI4,




(M+2)3 < 0 holds. Then, if the aggregate capital stock due
to greenﬁeld investment MxkG is suﬃciently large, the domestic ﬁrm may be forced out
of the market under the discriminatory policy.
36References
[1] Aitken, B. and Harrison, A., 1999, Do Domestic Firms Beneﬁtf r o mD i r e c tF o r e i g n
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89 NO. 3,
605-618.
[2] Aitken, B., Harrison, A. and R. E. Lipsey, 1996, ”Wages and Foreign ownership: A
comparative study of Mexico, Venzuela, and the Unisted States”, Journal of Inter-
national Economics, Vol 40, 343-371, May.
[3] Bartelsman, E and Beetsma, R., 2000, Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance
through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2543.
[4] Business Week, April 23 2001, October 2 2000, November 20 2000.
[5] Caves, R.E., 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. 2nd edition,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York).
[6] Dixit, A. and Shapiro, C., 1986, ”Entry Dynamics and Mixed Strategies.” In The
Economics of Strategic Planning: Essays in Honor of Joel Dean, edited by L. G.
Thomas. Lexington Books.
[7] Farrell, J and Shapiro, C, “Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly,”
RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 1990b, Vol. 21, 275-292.
[8] Fridolfsson, S.-O. and J. Stennek, 1999, Why Mergers Reduce Proﬁts, and Raise Share
Prices, Working Paper No. 511, (Stockholm: The Research Institute of Industrial
Economics).
37[9] Head K, and J. Reis, 1997, ”International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized
Competition Policy”, Canadian Journal of Economics v30, n4: 1104-23.
[10] Horn, H. and L. Persson, 2001, “The Equilibrium Ownership of an International
Oligopoly,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 53, No. 2.
[11] Horn, H. and L. Persson, 2001, “Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets,”
International Journal Of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19, 1213-1244.
[12] Kamien, M. I. and Zang, I., 1990, “The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisi-
tion,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2, 465-99.
[13] Lipsey, R. E., 2000, Interpreting developed countries’ foreign direct investmens,
NBER Working Paper 7810.
[14] Lopez-de-Silanes, F., 1997, “Determinates of Privatization Prices,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. CXII, 965-1025.
[15] Markusen, J. R., 1995, The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory
of International Trade, Journal of Economic Perspective 9, 169-189.
[16] Markusen, J. R., 1997, Trade vs. Investment Liberalization, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper: 6231 October.
[17] Norbäck, P. J. and Persson, L., 2001a, ”Privatization and Foreign Competition,”
Working Paper No.516, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm.
[18] Norbäck, P. J. and Persson, L., 2001b, ”Cross-border Acquisitions and Greenﬁeld En-
try,” Working Paper No.570, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm.
38[19] Scherer, F. M., and Ross, D., 1990, ”Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance,” Houghton Miﬄin Company.
[20] UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Geneva).
[21] The Economist, September 21, 2000.
39